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THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES IN
MISSOURI, 1952-1983
HARRY W. KROEGER*
A little more than thirty years ago, I wrote for this Quarterly an arti-
cle1 in which I discussed the effect in Missouri of a limitation void for
remoteness upon other limitations contained in the same deed or will
which, of themselves, were not remote. This Article is not intended to
cover the same ground as the earlier article, though occasional refer-
ences to it may be necessary to gain perspective. The focus at the pres-
ent time is upon the happenings touching upon the rule against
perpetuities since 1952. This focus requires a widening of scope be-
yond examination of questions concerning the effect of violation of the
rule. It also dictates a narrowing of the period being examined which
will undoubtedly entail omission of discussion of some important prin-
ciples which were not dealt with by the cases during the period.
I.
In 1952, Lockridge v. Mace2 and its progeny3 darkly beclouded many
titles to real estate and other property by declaring, for example:
"[Wihere portions of a will are void as being in contravention with the
rule against perpetuities, and those portions relate to the same property
and constitute a part of the same general plan of disposition, the valid,
as well as the invalid, portions will fall together."4 It seemed, at least to
most lawyers and even more importantly to title companies, that the
rule against perpetuities was something designed to produce retribution
for the sins of a testator, or for the sins of his counsel, in offending its
precepts. Intention had nothing to do with the situation. The testator
* A.B., 1919, LL.B. 1922, Washington University; LL.M., 1923, Columbia University.
Member of the Bar Association of Metropolitan St. Louis, the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, the Missouri Bar, American Bar Association, and American Law Institute.
1. See Kroeger, The Effect of Violation of the Rule Against Jerpetuities in Missouri 1952
WASH. U.L.Q. 297.
2. 109 Mo. 162, 18 S.W. 1145 (1892).
3. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kelley, 355 Mo. 924, 199 S.W.2d 344 (1947); Loud v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 298 Mo. 148, 249 S.W. 629 (1922); Riley v. Jaeger, 189 S.W. 1168 (Mo.
1916); Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 103 S.W. 989 (1907).
4. Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 298 Mo. 148, 185, 249 S.W. 629, 639 (1922).
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may have declared that he was making his will, but the court decreed
that he died intestate as to his property.
Happily, this feature of Missouri law was dealt with by the General
Assembly of Missouri in 1960, when it enacted what is now subsection
1 of section 442.555 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, which reads as
follows:
When any limitation or provision violates the rule against perpetuities or
a rule or policy corollary thereto and the instrument containing the limi-
tation or provision also contains other limitations or provisions which do
not in themselves violate the rule against perpetuities or any such rule or
policy, the other limitations or provisions shall be valid and effective in
accordance with their terms unless the limitation or provision which vio-
lates the rule against perpetuities or such rule or policy is manifestly so
essential to the dispositive scheme of the grantor, settlor or testator that it
is inferable that he would not wish the limitations or provisions which do
not in themselves violate the rule against perpetuities to stand alone.
Doubts as to the probable wishes of the grantor, settlor or testator shall be
resolved in favor of the validity of limitations and provisions.5
Thus, the statute sweepingly resolved the question as to the effect of
invalid limitations upon other limitations that are not in themselves
violative of the rule against perpetuities, and thus brought Missouri, in
that respect, into substantial conformity with the prevailing American
law6 and with the principles expressed in the American Law Institute's
first Restatement of Property.7
Unhappily, subsection 1 left other problems arising out of invalid
limitations to be solved, if at all, under subsection 2 of the statute by
recourse to the courts and application of a cypres doctrine.8 Unhap-
5. Mo. REv. STAT. § 442.555.1 (1978).
6. See Kroeger, supra note 1, at 300-03.
7. Section 402 of the first Restatement provided as follows:
When part of an attempted disposition fails as a direct consequence of the rule against
perpetuities, the effect, if any, of this partial invalidity upon the balance of the attempted
disposition is determined by judicially ascertaining whether the conveyor, if he had
known of this partial invalidity, would have preferred that
(a) all the balance of the attempted disposition take effect, in accordance with its
terms; or that
(b) certain parts of the balance of the attempted disposition fail, but the rest thereof
take effect in accordance with its terms; or that
(c) all the balance of the attempted disposition fail.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 402 (1940). See generally Kroeger, supra note I, at 303-05.
8. Subsection 2 of the statute provides as follows:
When any limitation or provision violates the rule against perpetuities or a rule or
policy corollary thereto and reformation would more closely approximate the primary
980 [Vol. 61:979
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pily, also, constitutional considerations produced subsection 3, which
declared that the section would not be applicable to any limitation or
provision as to which the period of the rule against perpetuities began
prior to November 1, 1965-the year when the section became effec-
tive.9 These considerations and the steady movement in other states,
by statute or judicial decision, to further reform the rule suggest the
desirability of scrutinizing at this time developments which have oc-
curred over the past thirty years.
An illustration will serve to introduce the problems. We start, not
with the case of the unborn widow or the fertile octogenarian, but with
a type of case which more commonly appears. Suppose M, by her will,
devised the residue of her estate to T in trust: (a) to pay the income
therefrom to M's nephew, N, for his life; (b) after the death of N, to pay
such income to the children of N who shall be living from time to time
and the descendants of any such children who may have died, they
taking per stirpes, until the eldest child of N who lives to attain the age
of thirty-five years shall arrive at that age; and (c) upon the happening
of such event, to distribute the trust property to the then living descend-
ants of N per stirpes; but (d) if no child of N shall attain the age of
thirty-five years, to be distributed to a specified charity. Suppose fur-
ther that upon the death of M, she was survived by N, aged fifty, and
three children of N-A, B, and C, aged respectively twenty-six, twenty-
four and eighteen-but by no other child of N or descendant of a de-
ceased child of N.
Under the Missouri cases1" the foregoing provisions of M's will
would violate the rule against perpetuities because, looked at from the
viewpoint of M's death, it was possible for N to have an additional
child or children born after the death of M so that vesting of the trust
corpus might be postponed beyond the period of a life in being and
twenty-one years. Prior to the enactment of section 442.555 it was gen-
erally supposed and justifiably feared that, under the Lockridge doc-
trine, the entire disposition would fail. Under that statute, however,
purpose or scheme of the grantor, settlor or testator than total invalidity of the limitation
or provision, upon the timely filing of a petition in a court of competent jurisdiction, by
any party in interest, all parties in interest having been served by process, the limitation
or provision shall be reformed, if possible, to the extent necessary to avoid violation of
the rule or policy and, as so reformed, shall be valid and effective.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 442.555.2 (1978).
9. Id. § 442.555.3.
10. See supra notes 2-3.
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the life estate of N would be saved, but the remainders to A, B, and C
would fail under the prevailing English and American rule which holds
that a class gift fails in its entirety if it is possible that any class mem-
ber's gift might vest beyond the period allowed by the rule against per-
petuities.'1 Although the gift might be reformed in accordance with
subsection 2 of the Missouri statute to carry out the intention of M, a
violation would have occurred which would require the institution of a
court action.
Now let us add an additional set of facts to the illustration given
above. Suppose further that upon the death of N, he was survived by
no child or children, other than A, B, and C, and by no descendant of
any deceased child. Under Missouri law, as it stands at this point in
time, the foregoing additional facts would be irrelevant. In Nelson v.
Mercantile Trust Co. ,12 the Supreme Court said just that, specifically:
"The fact that no such child was actually born does not change the
situation. It is thepossibility of such a birth, under the rule, that creates
the invalidity."' 13 More recently, in Davis v. McDowell 4 and Tucker v.
Ratley,'5 this possibilities test has been reiterated-in Tucker as fol-
lows: "In Missouri the rule is a 'possibilities' test, and not an 'actuali-
ties' test; that is, in determining the validity of any future interest, the
court cannot take account of subsequent actual events which would
have vested an otherwise invalid interest."' 6
This matter of testing validity as of the time of the transfer (whether
or not the result is one which the transferor may reasonably be said to
have intended), and of disregarding surrounding facts, is one which the
Missouri statute does not reach. The thrust of the statute is merely to
bring Missouri into conformity with the prevailing common-law rule of
separability of interests' 7 and to provide for reformation of the instru-
ment of transfer under certain circumstances by a court.' 8 Neither does
the statute reach problems arising out of conveyances and wills made
11. E.g., Thomas v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 224 Ga. 572, 163 S.E.2d 823 (1968); Turner v.
Turner, 260 S.C. 439, 196 S.E.2d 498 (1973); Leake v. Robinson, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817). See
Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 450 (1957).
12. 335 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. 1960).
13. d. at 172 (emphasis added).
14. 549 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
15. 568 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
16. Id. at 799.
17. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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prior to its effective date,19 of which there are many still in existence.
Hence, under the statute we have attained the common-law principle
of separability; where the statute does not apply, we remain, as we shall
observe in dealing with the cases, out in no man's land.
II.
A. Possibilities of Reverter
The thirty-year period began, so far as the rule against perpetuities is
concerned, with two interesting cases involving possibilities of reverter.
Such an interest had been defined in Missouri as the interest which
remains in the grantor when he conveys a base fee determinable on a
condition subsequent which may or may not eventuate, with the effect
of vesting immediately the whole fee title in the grantee, subject to be-
ing defeated by breach of the condition.2 °
Smith v. School District No. 621 was a suit to try title to real estate
which had been conveyed in 1877 to a school district. The land, which
had been carved out of a larger tract of 290 acres, was passed by a deed
which contained the following language: "[Wlhenever said land shall
cease to be used and occupied as a site for a schoolhouse and for school
purposes, then this conveyance shall be deemed and considered as for-
feited and the said land shall revert to the said party of the first part, his
heirs and assigns. ' '22 The larger tract passed, subject to an exception as
to the schoolhouse site, by mesne conveyances to the plaintiff. Defend-
ant school district, having ceased to use the land for school purposes,
had obtained a release from the heirs of the original grantor and
claimed under that document.23 The school district prevailed, as the
court held that a possibility of reverter had remained in the original
grantor and had passed to his heirs; that such possibility of reverter was
capable of being released to the holder of the determinable fee; and
that the release had the effect of turning the determinable fee into a fee
19. See supra text accompanying note 9.
20. Davis v. Austin, 348 Mo. 1094, 156 S.W.2d 903 (1941).
21. 250 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1952).
22. Id. at 795.
23. The release provided as follows:
This deed being made for the purpose of releasing any and all claims the grantors have
as heirs of [the original grantor] to the provisions in a deed dated August 1, 1877, exe-
cuted by [the original grantor] to [the original grantee].
Id. at 796.
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simple absolute.24 The rule against perpetuities was not offended be-
cause all interests vested at the date of the original deed.
Donehue v. Nilges25 presented a similar situation. There, the grantors
in 1908 conveyed a parcel of real estate, out of a larger tract, to a school
district by a deed of conveyance which provided that it was made for
the benefit of the school district so long as the parcel should be used for
a schoolhouse site, and if the parcel should no longer be so used, it was
to revert to the original grantors and those claiming "by, through or
under" them.26 (This the court construed to be a limitation to those
claiming by, through or under the grantors as owners of the larger
tract.) In a suit to determine title after the schoolhouse site had ceased
to be used as such, the issue was between the owners of the balance of
the larger tract, who claimed as successors in interest to the original
grantor, and the grantee of the heirs of the original grantor, who
claimed under a deed executed after the parcel had ceased to be used
for school purposes. The court held that the deed in effect created a
limitation over upon the termination of the base fee to the then owners
of the larger tract; that this limitation was void for remoteness; and that
the possibility of reverter remained in the grantor's heirs until condi-
tion broken. Hence, title to the former schoolhouse site was decreed in
the grantees of such heirs.27
To the same group of cases belongs Shipton v. Sheridan,2 8 decided
two decades later. In that case, there was a conveyance made in 1928
of a determinable fee to a school district conditional upon continued
use of the property as a school site. Upon cessation of such use, the site
was to "revert to and become the property of the then owner of the
farm from which said real estate was deeded .... ,29 The limitation in
the original conveyance to the then owner of the farm was held void for
remoteness, and the title was held to have reverted to the heirs of the
transferor.3 °
The doctrine of the possibility of reverter cases is not new. They are
applications of the basic principle that the rule against perpetuities has
reference to the time within which a title vests, and postponement of
24. Id. at 797.
25. 364 Mo. 705, 266 S.W.2d 553 (1954).
26. Id. at 708, 266 S.W.2d at 554 (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at 711, 266 S.W.2d at 556.
28. 531 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
29. Id. at 292.
30. Id. at 293.
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possession, for whatever period, does not violate the rule.3 In the
Smith case, the fee simple title was vested in the transferor prior to the
conveyance, and the possibility of reverter, not having been conveyed
by the deed, remained vested in the transferor. But where the trans-
feror, as in Donehue, attempted to limit the future interest to someone
else upon condition precedent, the limitation failed.
B. Commencement of the Period of the Rule, Alternative Remainders,
and Savings Clauses
The first important family-type case to come before the Missouri ap-
pellate courts during the thirty-year period was Nelson v. Mercantile
Trust Co.3 There, one L. C. Nelson in 1924 executed a trust instru-
ment, revocable by himself and his son, J. M. Nelson, Jr. during their
joint lives, wherein he provided that the trust income was to be paid to
himself and his son during their joint lives and thereafter to the survi-
vor of them during the survivor's life. After the death of such survivor,
the income was to be paid to the son's children-the settlor's grandchil-
dren-including those unborn at the time of the execution of the trust.
The corpus of each grandchild's share was to become distributable at
the discretion of the trustee when the grandchild reached twenty-one,
or absolutely when the grandchild reached the age of thirty, except that
$50,000 was to remain in trust for life. Upon the death of a grandchild
before (or without) receiving such share, the undistributed corpus of
that share was to be paid to the grandchild's lawful descendants, or if
there were no such descendants, to collaterals. The settlor died in 1931,
and his son died in 1936 survived by three sons, all of whom were in
being at the date of the death of the settlor. A grandson, who had then
become entitled to the income of a share, sought construction, contend-
ing that the instrument violated the rule against perpetuities.
The Nelson case is significant for two holdings:
(a) The Court disposed of the question as to when the period of the
rule begins to run in the case of a revocable trust, as follows: "The
period allowed by the rule began to run on July 15, 1931, when L. C.
Nelson died and the trust became irrevocable. ' 33 This holding was in
31. Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580, 602, 46 S.W.2d 135, 142 (1932); Schee v. Boone, 295 Mo.
212, 225-26, 243 S.W. 882, 885-86 (1922); Deacon v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 271 Mo. 669, 695,
197 Sw. 261, 267-68 (1917).
32. 335 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. 1960).
33. Id. at 172.
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accord with decisions in other states34 and is consistent with the Re-
statement (Second) of Property, where it is stated:
The period of the rule against perpetuities begins to run in a donative
transfer with respect to a non-vested interest in property as of the date
when no person, acting alone, has a power currently exercisable to be-
come the unqualified beneficial owner of all beneficial rights in the prop-
erty in which the non-vested interest exists.35
(b) An even more significant holding of the court lay in its ap-
proval of the savings clause contained in the trust instrument. The
court had determined that, without a savings clause, the provisions of
the instrument violated the rule against perpetuities, saying:
This because, in addition to the existing children of J. M. Nelson, Jr.,
provision was made therein for "such other lawful children as may here-
after be born unto the said J. M. Nelson, Jr." and their descendants. The
period allowed by the rule began to run on July 15, 1931, when L. C.
Nelson died and the trust became irrevocable. It was possible for a child
of J. M. Nelson, Jr. to have been born after that date and for the descend-
ants of said child to have acquired a vested interest in trust assets after the
expiration of the period permitted by the rule.36
However, the instrument also contained the following language:
The trust hereby created shall in no event continue for a period longer
than the lives of all of said children of said J. M. Nelson, Jr., and the
survivor of all of them, and twenty-one (21) years thereafter, at the end of
which time distribution shall be made in the manner herein provided,
irrespective of any other provision of this agreement.37
This clause was interpreted as referring to grandchildren who were in
being at the time of, and were named in, the trust instrument, and as
"saving" the trust from violation of the rule against perpetuities. The
clause in essence created a valid alternative remainder which removed
the possibility of failure to vest within the allowed period.
In careful legal draftsmanship, the use of such clauses in trust instru-
ments had become widespread long before the decision in Nelson,
whenever there was a conceivable doubt about a possible violation of
34. See, e.g., Cook v. Horn, 214 Ga. 289, 104 S.E.2d 461 (1958); Manufacturers Life Ins. Co.
v. Von Hanem-Young Co., 34 Hawaii 288 (1937); Schenectady Trust Co. v. Emmons, 261 A.D.
154, 25 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1941).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY-DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.2 (1983).
36. 335 S.W.2d at 172.
37. Id. at 170.
[Vol. 61:979
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the rule against perpetuities. The pitfalls still lay, and lie, in the paths
of the uninformed and the unwary.
C. Remainders and Reversions
Section 157 of the American Law Institute's Restatement of Property
succinctly stated:
A remainder can be
(a) indefeasibly vested; or
(b) vested subject to open; or
(c) vested subject to complete defeasance; or
(d) subject to a condition precedent.38
Under the rule against perpetuities, an interest falling within class
(d), commonly referred to as a "contingent" remainder, will fail unless
the condition precedent must (or under the wait-and-see doctrine,
does39) occur within the period allowed by the rule. Since 1952 several
cases have been decided by the appellate courts in Missouri on this
subject.
The first of these, Hereford v. Unknown Heirs, Grantees or Successors
of Adelle Tholozan, ° involved a will executed in 1862 by Mrs.
Tholozan, who died in 1877. By the terms of the will, she devised her
residuary estate in trust for the benefit of her niece, Adelle Philips, for
her sole and separate use during her life; and after her niece's death for
the sole and separate use of the niece's daughter, Eulalie Philips, and
"all other children of said Adelle Philips, if any should be born hereaf-
ter";41 or if the niece (or her children) died unmarried and without is-
sue, then to named sisters and a brother of the testatrix. Adelle Philips
died in 1920 at the age of eighty-five, leaving Eulalie as her only surviv-
ing child. Eulalie died in 1950 at the age of ninety, without having
married and without issue. The court, construing the will to provide
for vesting of the trust property at the death of Adelle Philips in her
daughter, Eulalie, held that the rule against perpetuities was not vio-
lated. The limitations to the named brother and sisters were treated as
an "afterthought" based on the possibility of the death of Eulalie, un-
married and without issue, prior to the deaths of the testatrix and
Adelle Philips. According to the court, these limitations indicated
38. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 157 (1936).
39. See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
40. 365 Mo. 1048, 292 S.W.2d 289 (1956) (en banc).
41. Id. at 1052, 292 S.W.2d at 291.
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merely the intention of the testatrix that, if such event occurred, the
named sisters and brother be preferred over testatrix' heirs in general.42
What rationale the court applied to the provisions of the will which
included afterborn children, if any, of Adelle Philips in the remainder
limitation is not clear. However, since such children would have been
in being at the death of Adelle Philips, and at that point of time would
(under the court's construction of the will) have become entitled to
vested interests in fee simple, the rule would not have been violated.
At that point of time also, the limitation in favor of the named siblings
would have become extinguished.
McGowan v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.43 was a case with involved
facts and diverse contentions. The principal facet of the case concerned
the contention that the rule against perpetuities was violated where the
settlor (one George S. Myers) of a trust created in 1904, the assets of
which consisted of shares in a corporation, tied the trust's termination
to the "expiration of the time for which it (the corporation) is now or-
ganized," or to the corporation's dissolution by reason of other causes.
The corporation had been organized in 1901 for a period of 60 years.
The income of the trust was to be paid to three daughters of the settlor
and a son of a deceased daughter, or the survivors of them, but if any
of the four died leaving afterborn children, such children were to take
the share of their parent. Upon the termination of the trust, the trust
assets were to be transferred to the grandson or his heirs. The subse-
quent facts were: (a) the three daughters died, two of them without
issue and one of them leaving an adopted child born in 1897, whose
children were the plaintiffs in the instant case; (b) upon the death in
1943 of the last surviving daughter, the grandson directed the trustee to
vote for dissolution of the corporation; and (c) the trustee caused the
corporation to be dissolved and distributed its assets to the grandson.
The plaintiffs claimed that the remainder interest violated the rule
against perpetuities and that upon distribution of the corporation's as-
sets a resulting trust arose in their favor as to one-half thereof. The
court held that, if there was a resulting trust, it arose in 1904 when the
trust was created, and not 1943, i.e., if the rule against perpetuities was
violated, the trust failed at the outset.44
42. Id. at 1058-59, 292 S.W.2d at 295-96.
43. 369 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1963).
44. Id. at 150-51. This holding virtually disposed of the case, for the plaintiffs' grandmother
had left a will bequeathing whatever interest she had in the trust to her husband, one Downey,
[Vol. 61:979
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The first Missouri case within the time span of this review to present
clearly the distinction between a remainder "vested subject to complete
defeasance" and a remainder "subject to a condition precedent," and
illustrating the subtle changes in these concepts, was Mercantile Trust
Co. v. Hammerstein.45 In that case, one Mrs. Griffin, who died in 1959,
created a testamentary trust which was to continue for a period of not
more than twenty-five years but which might be terminated earlier at
the discretion of the trustee. During the continuance of the trust, its
income was to be allocated to and among a number of named benefi-
ciaries, and at the termination of the trust, distribution of the corpus
was to be made to the income beneficiaries in proportion to their re-
spective income interests. In the case of one Mrs. Long, to whom a
one-sixth interest was allocated, the will provided that if she were to die
before termination of the trust, her share of the income during the bal-
ance of the trust period and of the principal upon termination were to
be paid in succession to specified members of her family. She died in
1961, during the life of the trust. Her executor claimed her share for
her estate, contending that the will violated the rule against perpetu-
ities. The court determined that it was the intention of the testatrix
gathered from the will as a whole, that the interests of the beneficiaries
were to become vested at the date of her death subject to defeasance in
the event of the death of a beneficiary within the trust period; it held
accordingly that there was no violation of the rule against perpetuities.
The gifts over were stated by the court to be:
in what may be termed several shifting and springing executory devises
... after the occurrence of the specified conditional limitation (so-called)
because of the distinction of that technical term from a "condition subse-
quent" which gives rise to a right of entry in the grantor or his heirs or the
testator's heirs on condition broken.46
The Hammerstein case actually announced no new development
under the rule against perpetuities. The outcome turned rather upon a
construction of the will to determine whether the interest of the first
taker was subject to a condition precedent or itself constituted a vested
and their mother had released her claim to Downey as well. In turn, Downey had conveyed his
entire interest to the settlor's grandson, the remainderman. Thereupon the curtain fell, and rose
again for an epilogue for which we need not wait.
45. 380 S.W.2d 287 (Mo. 1964).
46. .d. at 292 (citation omitted).
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interest subject to be divested upon the occurrence of a condition
subsequent.
The test whether a remainder is vested or contingent has been vari-
ously stated, a classic definition being that of Professor John Chipman
Gray, as follows: "A remainder is contingent if, in order for it to be-
come a present estate, the fulfillment of some condition precedent,
other than the determination of the preceding freehold estate, is neces-
sary."'47 What words ordinarily produce such result? In a later pas-
sage, Gray elucidated as follows: "If the conditional element is
incorporated into the description of or into the gift to the remainder-
man, then the remainder is contingent; but if, after words giving a vested
interest, a clause is added divesting it, the remainder is vested." 48
Since the development in Missouri of distinctions between contin-
gent and vested remainders is to be found in a long line of cases, some
of which do not involve the rule against perpetuities and others of
which do involve the rule 49-and which are frequently irreconcilable
with each other-an analysis of them must remain beyond the scope of
this Article. It will suffice to observe that, in the course of time, the
rationale of the courts has become less formalistic and founded more
upon a search for the intention of the transferor. As was said in Nor-
man v. Horton:5  "Courts now pierce ancient rules of feudal tenure
and for the construction of instruments to give effect to the intention of
the parties if such intention violates no public policy or positive rule of
law.""1 The character of the remainder, therefore, is in each case to be
determined as a question of construction of the instrument creating the
interest.
Viewed from the standpoint of the foregoing principles, Prior v.
Prior52 presented no great difficulty. There, a will devised land to two
daughters of the testator "until both shall have died"; and upon the
death of the survivor of them, "to the bodily heirs" of three daughters,
of whom the third had predeceased the making of the will. The fee was
47. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 9 (R. Gray 4th ed. 1942).
48. Id. § 108 (emphasis added).
49. See, e.g., Knox College v. Jones Store Co., 406 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. 1966); Norman v. Hor-
ton, 344 Mo. 290, 126 S.W.2d 187 (1939); Gardner v. Vanlandingham, 334 Mo. 1054, 69 S.W.2d
947 (1934); Eckle v. Ryland, 256 Mo. 424, 165 S.W. 1035 (1914); Sullivan v. Garesche, 229 Mo.
496, 129 S.W. 949 (1910); Graves v. Hyer, 626 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
50. 344 Mo. 290, 126 S.W.2d 187 (1939).
51. Id. at 296, 126 S.W.2d at 190.
52. 395 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. 1965).
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held to have vested in the testator's grandchildren upon the death of
the survivor of the daughters. Since she was necessarily a life in being
at the death of the testator, there was no violation of the rule against
perpetuities.
In the foregoing cases decided since 1952, the courts did not, at least
overtly, inquire whether a condition was incorporated "into the
description of or into the gift to the remainderman" or speak about
"words giving a vested interest" (using Gray's words); but in each case,
the courts appeared to base their conclusions upon a discerned intent of
the transferor,53 aided, perhaps, by the principle that where more than
one construction of an instrument is possible, that construction which
favors validity will be preferred over a construction which produces
invalidity.54
Remarkable as it may seem, the Missouri appellate courts have not
been called upon within the last three decades to decide a case in the
perpetuities field in which the governing instrument created an estate
upon a condition that was not susceptible of an interpretation which
would have delineated a freehold estate subject to a condition subse-
quent. The problem did appear recently in Graves v. Hyer,55 a case
which did not involve the rule against perpetuities. There, the testator
left real estate to his granddaughter Jennie for her life and "at her
death, to the heirs of her body"; and in default of the granddaughter's
issue, to his son Charles and the "heirs of his body"; and in default of
issue of the son, to "my nearest blood kin." Charles predeceased the
testator, leaving no issue. Jennie survived the testator, but also died
without issue. The court held that vesting occurred at the death of Jen-
nie; that the interests of the "nearest blood kin" were subject to a condi-
tion precedent; and awarded the property to the testator's "nearest
blood kin," determined as of the death of Jennie.
In order for there to have been a divestiture upon the occurrence of a
condition subsequent, there must necessarily have been a prior estate
capable of divestiture, but neither Jennie nor Charles had such an es-
tate. If Jennie had not been a life in being, we must assume that in
53. This process, too, has some hazards. Aside from its subjectivity, it assumes-contrary to
fact in most cases-that the transferor has given minute attention to the character and incidents of
the future interests which the instrument creates and to the language used in the instrument to
create them.
54. Eg., St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Bassett, 337 Mo. 604, 621, 85 S.W.2d 569, 578 (1935).
55. 626 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
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Missouri, which adheres to the possibilities or what-might-happen test
of validity under the rule against perpetuities, the result would neces-
sarily have been invalidity.
D. Options, Preemptive Rights, and Contracts of Sale
Within the past thirty years, there have been several cases in Mis-
souri which have dealt with the question whether certain types of op-
tions or preemptive rights of purchase are interests falling within the
rule against perpetuities. The holdings in such cases on the whole do
not represent departures from the principles worked out in general
American law with respect to such interests. If an option or a preemp-
tive right does fall within the scope of the rule, the issue almost always
is whether such a right will terminate within a life in being or within
the gross period allowed by the rule.
In Tucker v. Ratley,56 we find a clear recognition of the principle that
an option, not limited with respect to the time for its exercise, falls
within the restrictions of the rule against perpetuities. 7 In that case,
the common source of title to the property involved was in one Harry
Tucker, who conveyed to the Ratleys (husband and wife) 120 acres of
land, reserving in himself the mineral rights, the rights to ingress and
egress, and the right to conduct mining operations, plus an option to
repurchase the property at a price not to exceed $50 per acre. The suc-
cessors in interest to forty acres of the land brought suit to quiet title.
The court held that the option to purchase was subject to the restric-
tions of the rule and thus invalid. 8 However, it treated as valid the
reservation of the mineral rights as a separation of the interests in the
surface and the interests in the minerals; and it treated the rights of
56. 568 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
57. The generality of this statement of the rule must be tempered by consideration of cases
which hold that when no time is designated for the expiration of an option, it must be exercised
within a reasonable time under the particular circumstances. See Magee v. Mercantile Commerce
Bank & Trust Co., 343 Mo. 1022, 124 S.W.2d 1121 (1938), where an alleged oral option to require
the repurchase of bonds by a seller, without specifying the duration of the option, was held to
continue for a reasonable time only. In a later case, Burg v. Bonne Terre Foundry Co., 354
S.W.2d 303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962), the court interpreted a sales agency contract providing for the
continuance, after the contract's termination, of payments to the sales representative for his cus-
tomers to refer only to orders solicited before the contract's termination. The court said of such a
contract, "[W]hen executed for an indefinite period, and by its nature it is not deemed to be
perpetual, it may be terminated at will upon reasonable notice. ... Id. at 308 (quoting Clark-
son v. Standard Brass Mfg. Co., 237 Mo. App. 1018, 1032, 170 S.W.2d 407, 415 (1943)).
58. 568 S.W.2d at 800.
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ingress and egress as appurtenant to the mineral estate and thus as im-
mediately vested interests.
(As noted earlier,59 the court in Tucker reaffirmed the possibilities
test with respect to the rule against perpetuities, rejecting as irrelevant
the contention of the defendants that they were ready and willing at
any time to exercise the option to purchase within the period permitted
by the rule. Tucker was also one of the cases in which the courts re-
ferred to section 442.555, holding it inapplicable by reason of subsec-
tion 3 thereof, which proscribes retroactive application.6")
The Missouri courts have, however, been loath to invalidate an op-
tion or preemptive right by reason of the rule against perpetuities
where it has been possible to construe the grant to be intended in favor
of the grantee personally. In Kershner v. Hurlbert,6' there was a con-
tract between a seller of part of his tract of land and a buyer, which
provided in part that if either buyer or seller should desire to sell his
respective portion of the land, he would give the other first right to
purchase at the acquisition price. The court, faced with the contention
that the contract violated the rule, sustained its validity on the ground
that the preemptive rights of purchase were personal and terminated
with the deaths of the parties, i.e., within a life in being.62
Beets v. Tyler63 was a case in which the developer of a subdivision
conveyed lots by deeds containing covenants, each granting preemptive
rights, in favor of the developer and the lot holders adjoining the con-
veyed land, to purchase the subject lots, upon terms fixed. The cove-
nant was to run for twenty years, subject to renewal for additional
twenty-year periods by the owners (at the end of each period) of a ma-
jority of front feet in the subdivision. The suit arose out of an at-
tempted sale during the second twenty-year period without compliance
with the covenant. The court rejected defendant's claim that the cove-
nant created a perpetuity, noting that it had been renewed by a major-
ity in front feet of the lot owners as provided for in the deeds, and that,
as a result, the gross period was one for less than twenty-one years.'
59. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
60. See supra text accompanying note 9.
61. 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1955).
62. Id. at 623. Ultimately the court refused to enforce the terms of the contract, ruling that
because there was no social or economic objective to be accomplished thereby, the contract was an
unreasonable restraint on alienation. Id. at 626.
63. 365 Mo. 895, 290 S.W.2d 76 (1956).
64. Id. at 903, 290 S.W.2d at 82.
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Davies v. McDowell65 involved a party wall agreement between the
owners of two halves of a building in which each party agreed that, if
he received an acceptable bona fide offer from a third party to purchase
his unit, he would give the owner of the other unit a preemptive right of
purchase at the price offered by the stranger. A paragraph of the agree-
ment declared that the agreements "hereby created are and shall be
perpetual" and were binding on "each and every purchaser, his heirs
and assignees. 66 In a suit for specific performance of the agreement,
the defense was made that the agreement constituted a violation of the
rule against perpetuities. The court, after noting the distinction be-
tween preemptive rights which are personal to the optionee and pre-
emptive rights which are unlimited as to time, declared the
controverted provisions in the party wall agreement to be void. The
opinion also contained a reaffirmation of the "possibilities" test as to
validity, and cited subsection 1 of section 442.55567 as preventing other
provisions of the party wall agreement from being contaminated by the
void provisions.68
To be distinguished from cases involving options or preemptive
rights are those cases in which the interest involved is based upon the
advance by one person of money for the purchase of property, title to
which is taken in the name of another. Here there can be no basis for
invoking the rule against perpetuities because the equitable interest
arising from advancing the money is vested at the very inception of the
transaction.69 A somewhat similar situation was presented in Heald v.
Erganian.70 There, Heald negotiated the purchase of real estate for
Erganian and his wife, who advanced money for the purchase and took
title in their names upon an agreement that when the property ulti-
mately was resold, Heald would receive one-half of the profit for his
efforts in negotiating the transaction. Subsequently the property was
sold at a profit. Heald sued for his share of the profit, and the defense
was violation of the rule. The court held that the rule could not apply
because the plaintiff, upon the execution and delivery of a deed to de-
65. 549 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
66. Id. at 621.
67. See supra text accompanying note 5.
68. 549 S.W.2d at 624.
69. No Missouri case on this precise point has arisen in the period under examination. Cf.
Shirley v. Van Every, 159 Va. 762, 167 S.E. 345 (1933) (treating purchaser as holder of forfeitable
vested interest).
70. 377 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1964).
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fendants, became vested with an equitable interest in the property and
there was no further estate to which the rule could apply."
E. Charitable Trusts
The long recognized principle that the rule against perpetuities has
no application to charitable trusts found expression within recent years
in three Missouri cases.72 What constitutes a charity, to what extent a
court of equity has jurisdiction to alter the directions of the testator or
settlor of the trust, and under what circumstances directed accumula-
tions may be ordered distributed (questions touched upon in those
cases) involve matters which go beyond the scope of this Article.
This then is the array of cases on perpetuities within the last thirty
years.
III.
The past thirty years have been a placid period i Missouri, so far as
the rule against perpetuities is concerned. Section 442.555, while it
may have had a psychological influence on the courts, received only
passing mention in two of the cases involving the rule which were de-
cided by the appellate courts during those years. More frequently men-
tioned, sometimes gratuitously, was Missouri's adherence to the what-
might-happen approach or possibilities test of violation of the rule.
Yet, paradoxically, the validity of nearly all of the family dispositions
dealt with since the enactment of the statute has been sustained.
Nelson v. Mercantile Trust Company73 suggested clearly the pitfalls
that may still be encountered as a result of the possibilities test. It will
be recalled that there the court concluded that the rule against perpetu-
ities had been violated in the transferor's basic plan of disposition, but
it upheld the validity of the disposition on the basis of a valid savings
clause. Such clauses had, for many years, been extensively employed
by draftsmen in wills and trusts as bulwarks against the harsh applica-
tion of the what-might-happen approach.
But what if the draftsman had been less careful or less knowledgea-
ble and had failed to include a savings clause? Presumably Nelson
71, Id. at 440.
72. Earney v. Clay, 462 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. 1971); Epperly v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank,
415 S.W.2d 819 (Mo.), modfed, 457 S.W.2d I (Mo. 1967) (per curiam); Mercantile Trust Co. v.
Shriners' Hosp. for Crippled Children, 551 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
73. 335 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. 1960). See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
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would have been decided upon the law as it existed prior to 1952, for
the period allowed by the rule began to run in that case on July 15,
193 1. 4 Section 442.555 would not have saved the disposition, first, be-
cause the section did not apply retroactively, and second, and more
importantly, because Missouri followed, and continues to adhere to,
the possibilities test.75
Prior to the enactment of section 442.555, bills were introduced in the
Missouri Legislature which would have had the effect of according to
dispositive instruments somewhat the same benefits as were achieved in
the Nelson case by careful draftsmanship.76 The bills in each case were
opposed in the Senate Judiciary Committee, principally on the ground
that in practical effect they enabled the wait-and-see test to be applied
within parameters. Ultimately, the bills were not reported out.77
As Missouri law now stands (and indeed as it was generally accepted
as standing even prior to Nelson), a disposition otherwise violative of
the rule may be prevented from failing by the insertion of a savings
clause which evinces the transferor's intent to accept a valid alternative
to his original dispositive scheme, if the latter should, for any reason,
be deemed to embody limitations which are too remote; but the same
disposition, not supported by such a clause, fails.
Under the "wait-and-see" doctrine, the result in Nelson (regardless
of whether or not a savings clause was contained in the instrument)
could have been achieved quite simply. The difficulty in that case, as
will be recalled, was the inclusion of possible unborn descendants
among the persons in whom a remainder interest might possibly vest.
But there were no grandchildren who were not in being at the death of
L. C. Nelson when the period of the rule against perpetuities began to
74. See supra text accompanying note 33.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16. Missouri does, however, follow the generally
recognized "second look" doctrine, under which a court dealing with a question concerning the
validity of the exercise of a power of appointment will examine facts existing at the time of its
exercise. See Rutherford v. Farrar, 118 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938) (no evidence that actual
appointees were not lives in being at time of creation of power). This is true even though the
period of the rule is measured from the date of creation of the power. See St. Louis Union Trust
Co. v. Bassett, 337 Mo. 604, 85 S.W.2d 569 (1935).
76. E.g., H.B. No. 34, 71st Gen. Assem. (Mo. 1961); H.B. No. 341, 70th Gen. Assem. (Mo.
1959).
77. The history of this proposed legislation, the manner in which it was dealt with, and the
development of what has become § 442.555 have been outlined in Eckhardt, Rule.Against Perpelu.
ides in Missouri, 30 Mo. L. REv. 27, 62 n.120 (1965), and in Fratcher, The Missouri Perpetuites
Act, 45 Mo. L. REv. 240, 251-53 (1980).
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run.7" Because all interests in fact vested within the period of the rule,
wait-and-see would have upheld the disposition.
The American Law Institute had before it at its May, 1978 session,
Tentative Draft No. 1 and at its May, 1979 session, Tentative Draft No.
2 of the Restatement (Second) of Property-Donative Transfers, both of
which dealt with the rule against perpetuities and related rules. At the
threshold was the question whether the what-might-happen or pos-
sibilities test of violation of the rule adopted in the Institute's first Re-
statement7 9-which at the time of its adoption represented the
prevailing American law-should be readopted, or whether the wait-
and-see or "actualities" test-which specified that an interest in prop-
erty would fail if it "does not vest" within the period allowed by the
rule against perpetuities°--should be adopted.
When first presented in 1978, the issue was extensively discussed and
debated, with particular attention being given to the views of Professor
Richard R. Powell (who had been the Reporter for the first Restate-
ment) in favor of the retention of the what-might-happen approach.8 '
The issue came to a vote in 1979 and the wait-and-see doctrine was
then adopted by a clear majority.8 2
Dissatisfaction had developed with a rule that made the validity of a
disposition depend upon the absence of any possibility, however re-
mote, that vesting could be postponed beyond the period allowed by
the rule. Twenty-one states had adopted statutes which either incorpo-
rated a wait-and-see test in determining the validity of non-vested in-
terests or substantially modified the what-might-happen approach.83 A
78. Professor William F. Fratcher, in discussing the Nelson case, took the view that the re-
mainder limitations to the descendants of those grandchildren alive at the settlor's death were
valid in any event. See Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REV. 93, 94-95
(1962). This would certainly have been true if Missouri, by statute or decision, had adopted the
wait-and-see doctrine. However, the Nelson court had expressly reaffirmed the possibilities test,
and it may well have premised its holding upon the inclusion among the remaindermen of unborn
grandchildren and upon the fact that, at the very least, there were, in the cases of the $50,000
reservations for the grandchildren, gifts over to collateral takers in the event that an unborn
grandchild died without issue. This would raise the possibility, in the case of an afterborn
grandchild, of a gift over, and would produce infectious invalidity in the cases of the other mem-
bers of the class.
79. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 370 (1944).
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY-DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1978).
81. See id. app. A at 127-44.
82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY-DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 (1983).
83. These statutes were collected and cited at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY-DON-
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substantial number of more recent cases84 had declined to accept the
what-might-happen approach. Exemplary of these is Merchants Na-
tional Bank v. Curtis, 5 where the testator's bequest to his grandchil-
dren was in jeopardy due to the possibility of further grandchildren
being born to couples with grown children.86 The New Hampshire
Supreme Court there said:
There is no logical justification for deciding the problem as of the death of
the testator on facts that might have happened rather than the facts which
actually happened. It is difficult to see how the public welfare is
threatened by a vesting that might have been postponed beyond the pe-
riod of perpetuities but actually was not. . . .When a decision is made
at a time when the events have happened, the court should not be com-
pelled to consider only what might have been and completely ignore what
was.
87
In Missouri, a situation such as the one which appeared in the New
Hampshire case would, if the rule against perpetuities had begun to run
after the effective date of section 442.555, be dealt with under the cy
pres doctrine. But it is difficult to perceive the justification for a court-
decreed "reformation" of an instrument-albeit with the purpose of ar-
riving at what the transferor would have intended-in a case where the
transferor has clearly and unambiguously stated his intention.
Nor does it seem persuasive to say that the operation of the wait-
and-see doctrine would be. impeded by the adherence of Missouri
courts to the doctrine of "infectious invalidity."88, Infectious invalidity
necessarily presupposes the existence of an invalid limitation which, by
reason of its interrelationship with other limitations which of them-
selves are not too remote, infects the latter, causing the good to fall with
the bad. Under the wait-and-see doctrine, the number of potential in-
ATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 reporter's note 2, at 87-92 (rent. Draft No. 2, 1979). Since the promulga-
tion of the wait-and-see approach by the American Law Institute, Virginia has adopted
substantially the position of the Restatement (Second). See VA. CODE § 55-13.3 (1982).
84. Judicial support for the wait-and-see doctrine exists in Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY-
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 reporter's note 2, at 96-100 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1979).
85. 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953).
86. Under one permissible construction of the bequest, the representatives of the testator's
siblings would take in the event of the death of his grandchildren (including those unborn at his
death) without issue. Id. at 231, 97 A.2d at 212.
87. Id. at 232, 97 A.2d at 212.
88. See Fratcher, supra note 77, at 252-53 (suggesting that the doctrines of wait-and-see and
of infectious invalidity are necessarily incompatible).
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fecting agents is simply reduced. As long as no interest does, in fact,
vest too remotely, the entire disposition is valid, as the transferor in-
tended it to be; and no social interest is transgressed by a possibility
which does not materialize. Only when the possibility of remote vest-
ing exists and in actuality occurs, would there be a need for invocation
of cypres.89
Significant variations and some uncertainties have arisen in the states
which in one form or another have adopted the wait-and-see principle
in respect of the proper selection of the "lives in being" at the time
when the period of the rule begins to run. Since under the wait-and-see
doctrine the test of validity of an interest would no longer be applied as
of the time when the period begins to run, the selection of the measur-
ing lives (from among the lives then in being) would not necessarily be
limited to those recognized at common law under the possibilities test.
And, it may be noted that even under the common law the number of
measuring lives employed was not limited, so long as that number was
not such as to render identification difficult or unreasonable. 90 The ex-
perience of states in which wait-and-see has been completely or par-
tially adopted and the various alternative approaches to the
identification of measuring lives have been discussed extensively else-
where.9' The test embodied in the Restatement (Second) is set forth in
a footnote below.92
89. The American Law Institute adopts substantially this position in RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF PROPERTY-DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.5 (1983). This section applies in cases where,
notwithstanding the wait-and-see test, an interest remains which has not vested within the allowed
time. It does not contain the term "infectious invalidity," but provides that if an interest does not
or cannot vest within the period of the rule,
the transferred property shall be disposed of in the manner which most closely effectu-
ates the transferor's manifested plan of distribution and which is within the limits of the
rule against perpetuities.
Id.
90. Eg., Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321, 334 (1908); In re Villar, [19291 1 Ch. 243, 249 (1928).
9 1. See Note, Measuring Lives Under Wait-and-See Versions of the Rule Against Pervetuites,
60 WASH. U.L.Q. 577 (1982); Note, Understanding the Measuring Life in the Rule 4gainst Perpetu-
iWes, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 265.
92. (1) If an examination of the situation with respect to a donative transfer as of the
time the period of the rule against perpetuities begins to run reveals a life or lives in
being within 21 years after whose deaths the non-vested interest in question will neces-
sarily vest, if it ever vests, such life or lives are the measuring lives for purposes of the
rule against perpetuities so far as such non-vested interest is concerned and such non-
vested interest cannot fail under the rule. A provision that terminates a non-vested inter-
est if it has not vested within 21 years after the death of the survivor of a reasonable
number of persons named in the instrument of transfer and in being when the period of
the rule begins to run is within this subsection.
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THE FUTURE
The Missouri courts, over the last three decades, have demonstrated
kinder feelings with regard to the rule against perpetuities than the
courts of half a century ago. By construing a gift as one upon condition
subsequent (even though there was no freehold estate to be cut down
by the occurrence of the condition 93), or by relying more extensively
upon the rule of construction that when there are two or more possible
constructions, one which would render the disposition valid is to be
preferred over another which would render it invalid,94 or generally by
cultivating a benign approach, the courts have, without the aid of wait-
and-see, achieved results congruous therewith. Concerning such a ten-
dency, Professor Casner has said:
In connection with the adoption of the wait-and-see approach, it should
be noted that, in the past, courts frequently strained the construction of
language employed in a disposition to eliminate the possibility of an in-
terest vesting too remotely. In one sense, this was adopting a wait-and-see
approach. 95
However, there will undoubtedly appear one day a transfer which
cannot be construed in two ways. Having heretofore desisted from do-
ing so, let us now look at the "unborn widow" case.
Suppose that T, by his will, leaves property to his fifty-five year old
son S for life, then to S's widow for her life, with remainder over to S's
(2) If no measuring life with respect to a donative transfer is produced under subsec-
tion (1), the measuring lives for purposes of the rule against perpetuities as applied to the
non-vested interest in question are:
(a) The transferor if the period of the rule begins to run in the transferor's life-
time; and
(b) Those individuals alive when the period of the rule begins to run, if reason-
able in number, who have beneficial interests vested or contingent in the property in
which the non-vested interest in question exists and the parents and grandparents
alive when the period of the rule begins to run of all beneficiaries of the property in
which the non-vested interest exists, and
(c) The donee of a nonfiduciary power of appointment alive when the period of
the rule begins to run if the exercise of such power could affect the non-vested inter-
est in question.
A child in gestation when the period of the rule begins to run who is later born alive is
treated as a life in being at the time the period of the rule begins and, hence, may be a
measuring life.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY-DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.3 (1983).
93. See Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hammerstein, 380 S.W.2d 287 (Mo. 1964), discussedin supra
text accompanying notes 45-46.
94. See supra note 54.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY-DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 reporter's note 2,
at 68 (1983).
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issue, or in default of issue to the children of T's nephew, N, in fee.
Suppose further that at the time of the execution of the will and at the
time of T's death, S was a widower, but later married a woman who
was alive at the death of T and survived S as his widow. Suppose fur-
ther that S died without issue.
Will a Missouri court, with continuing fidelity to the possibilities test,
declare the remainder to the children of T's nephew N to be violative of
the rule against perpetuities because S, after the death of T and at the
age of fifty-five, might have married a woman who was not born when
the testator died and who might have outlived S by more than twenty-
one years? Or will it make a new will for the testator? Or will the
appellate courts in the meantime have worked out some principle
based upon, or having an effect similar to, the wait-and-see approach?
Or will the legislature in the meantime have become appreciative of the
absurdity of the what-might-happen approach and have enacted an-
other subsection to section 442.555 adopting wait-and-see or some vari-
ation thereof?
The imponderables have been stated. The most that can be conjec-
tured is that the courts will, pending further legislation, apply section
442.555 (as far as it goes) in cases where it is applicable, and will evince
a kindlier approach toward cases in which a transferor by inadvertent
or ill-advised words might have offended, but in actual fact did not
offend, the majesty of the rule against perpetuities.
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